Author Archives: Bruno Mariotto Jubran

About Bruno Mariotto Jubran

Internacionalista, Pesquisador da FEE International Affairs Researcher at the FEE.

Is the global flexibilization of labor relations a generalized trend? A brief analysis of the situation of East Asia

Over the last few decades, especially after the great global economic crisis in the late 2000s, the deterioration of labor relations has been noticed and discussed, with particular interest in the European Union and the United States. In 2013, the International Labor Review, a publication related to the International Labor Organization (ILO), devoted an entire issue to the situation of labor relations in Europe, with mostly pessimistic conclusions. This scenario shares similarities with those of the United States and some Latin American countries, including Brazil. Indeed, it is possible to infer a correlation between the economic globalization and the decay in labor relations, at least in the most developed regions. However, what is happening in other parts of the world? This text debates the situation in East Asia, where a great deal of attention is being drawn to the best public policy practices, given the recent quick development of markets in that region.

Before proceeding to the question itself, one should note that the national systems of labor regulations appear to be in a more favorable situation for workers in Europe, North America and even in some of the most industrialized countries in Latin America than in other parts of the world. However, it is necessary to ponder not only the static situation of these systems, but also the recent trend in both groups. As most of the recent studies have assessed the problematic in Europe and Latin America and identified a considerable worsening trend in those places, this paper emphasizes the recent evolution in labor relations in Eastern Asia, by selecting three among the most representative emerging economies in the region: China, India and South Korea.

The Chinese case seems to be quite elucidative. Although Chinese regulations still remain far tougher than their analogues in Europe, in terms of wage levels and access to basic rights, such as retirement, the central government has acted to improve labor policy. The basis of current national-level labor laws is relatively recent (in force since 1995), having been complemented by the Collective Contracts Regulation of 2004. As Wu and Sun (2014) stated, a government-led system of mediation and arbitration between workers and employers is in force. This arrangement gives the government the prerogative to impose conditions and limits on wages and working hours and impells the parties to negotiate, among other things. The policy of rights granting might be understood as a response of national leaders to the growing agitation among Chinese workers in recent times and to the upsurge in the number of cases of labor judicial disputes all over the country, initiated in mid-1990s. In 1992, there were around 18,000 labor disputes, while in 2008 this number increased by 90 times. Chinese labor legislation, in addition to being more restrictive in comparison with the ones of its Western counterparts, remains based on an individualized logic which prohibits the right to strike and the creation of independent trade unions, as the authors point. However, as previously noted in this publication, the relative improvement of workers’ welfare, especially in large cities, can also be interpreted as part of a broader plan of the Chinese Communist Party to switch the prevailing export-led model of development to another one based on the domestic market, given the persisting turbulence in the global economy. The expansion of labor rights, therefore, features a significant propositional and even strategic nature.

India, the second most populous country in the world after China and with an increasingly prominent participation in global politics and economy, offers a significantly different picture. On the one hand, around 84% of Indian workers had informal occupations in 2012, according to ILO data, a proportion that is larger than that of other developing countries. On the other hand, this percentage has decreased over the last few decades, albeit in a rather slow pace. Since the early 2010s, the Indian government has been promoting changes to guarantee labor rights which focus on specific groups, such as the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, of 2013, and the National Policy for Domestic Workers, of 2011, as reported in a recent publication of ILO’s Decent Work Program. It should be noted, however, that the government of Narendra Modi has publicly favored flexibilization in labor standards.

Another interesting regional case is that of South Korea. Despite the rapid economic advance in the last few decades, which has promoted the nation to the group of the Asian Tigers, its economy was hit by the great global crisis of 2008, after having been hit even more severely by the East Asian crisis of 1997. During the crisis of the 1990s, the country suffered a major shortage of foreign currency that had an impact on its macroeconomic indicators. Like what other neighboring countries did, the South Korean government requested a bailout from the International Monetary Fund, which, in response, imposed the granting of assistance to the implementation of fiscal policies, which had great impact on labor relations. After a rapid hike in unemployment rates (from around 2.5% in the last quarter of 1997 to 8.5% one year later), the austerity measures were gradually replaced by a differentiated approach, known at that time as the Social Agreement for Overcoming the Economic Crisis. This policy combined pro-market elements with the expansion of the social security net for workers. On the capital side, it sought to stabilize price and wage levels and to facilitate the practice of shutdowns; on the labor side, it boosted the policy of job creation, enhanced unemployment insurance and empowered labor unions. The maintenance of this compromise solution helped to soften the damages of the global crisis in the second half of 2008, considering that the employment rate was practically unharmed throughout that period. In recent times, there have been diverging political pressures, either by large business groups or by trade unions, to change the existing labor standards. In 2017, the election of the center-left Democratic Party encouraged unions to demand policies that tackled the high proportion of part-time workers and reduce the number of working hours, which is one of the highest averages among the members of the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

From the analysis of the three largest economies in East Asia, one should resume the initial interrogation. This text suggest that, although labor laws in the three Asian nations remain much stricter than those in Europe and North America, they have neither clearly incorporated the tendency of flexibilization in labor relations nor undergone significant changes in their content. The main innovations can be identified in India, where the legislation has been changed to improve the situation of women in the workplace. However, it is in political disputes that relative gains for workers can be better noticed. In South Korea, workers have been granted important benefits, such as the policy of job protection and the relative strengthening of trade unions. In China, general improvements in the welfare of workers respond to both the fears of a widespread social upheaval and the purpose of altering Chinese pattern of export-led growth.

It should be stressed that workers in these nations are not in a comfortable position. Firstly, as stated, their situation remains highly precarious, notoriously in India. Secondly, it is not possible to conclude that improvements will remain unscathed, once the rise in the bargaining power of workers might lead to the reaction of business sectors in these same countries. This picture can already be seen in India, where calls for flexibilization have gained ground in public discourse. With this brief exposition, it is worth concluding that labor relations in the most significant emerging markets of East Asia have been witnessing a distinct process from those of Europe, North America and even parts of Latin America. However, it is too early to assert that this sui generis Eastern experience will be permanent.

The international climate change regime: evolution, contradictions, and the position of Brazil

The attenuation of the increase in greenhouse gas emissions by anthropic action, which is one of the main causes of climate change, is one of the main global debates today. In recent years, there have been major worldwide institutional developments, in accordance with one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations (UN)[1]. Despite the broad consensus among scientists and organizations about the causes and possible consequences of climate change, several factors explain the political contradictions surrounding the issue, for instance: the discrepant socioeconomic configurations between societies, the recent disengagement of some rich countries which emit high levels of greenhouse gases (GHG), mainly carbon dioxide (CO2), and the lack of effective mechanisms to identify violations and punish their perpetrators.

Although the discussions on the need for environmental protection have accompanied human history from the beginning, only in the 1970s the issue started to be faced in a genuinely global way, after the Stockholm Conference (1972) took place. Since then, the World Meteorological Organization, a specialized body of the UN System, has been increasingly relevant. This trend culminated in the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in 1988, whose goal is to provide scientific research for the international negotiations on the topic.

There are currently three main provisions that stipulate norms and standards to mitigate global GHG emissions, namely: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC was one of the outcomes of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, which is the official designation of Rio-92. Since then, the countries that signed that instrument have held annual meetings, the Conventions of the Parts (COPs), which are the main decision-           making bodies under the agreement and aim at advancing the most substantive discussions on the subject. In November 2017, the COP-23 will take place in Bonn (Germany).

One of the guidelines of the UNFCCC is the notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. It recognizes that the more industrialized countries should bear a significantly greater burden to mitigate the problem, given their historical CO2 emissions. Two special lists of countries have been created, Annex I and Annex II, which were given additional attributions. Annex I encompasses the “industrialized countries”, including Central and Eastern Europe “transition economies”. In the year 2000, all these nations should have maintained emissions below the level recorded in 1990. They were also required to submit annual reports on their national policies to the Convention. Annex II countries, all of which are included in Annex I, should also allocate funds to finance projects to minimize climate change effects in developing countries and facilitate technology transfer to the latter. Developing nations, which are absent from both lists, are also expected to submit reports, but less frequently and with more generic targets than those specified in Annex I. The agreement also gives special attention to ecological problems in less developed countries[2].

The second pillar of this regime — the Kyoto Protocol — was established in Japan at the 3rd COP, in 1997 (in force since 2005). Through this protocol countries commit themselves to pursue reductions in emissions through binding targets, but the differentiation principle between developed and developing nations is maintained. The first emission reduction cycle started only in 2008 and ended in 2012. In this period, the Annex 1 governments complied themselves to reduce GHG emissions in 5% in comparison with the 1990 levels. The second period, decided at COP18, in Doha (Qatar), shall take eight years, from January 2013 to December 2020, with targets of 18% below the 1990 levels. In addition, the Protocol provided three flexible mechanisms: international emissions trading[3], clean development mechanism (CDM)[4], of which Brazil was one of the sponsors, and joint implementation[5]. In general, the parties of the Kyoto Protocol have been relatively successful in achieving the goals of the first cycle. One of the main reasons is the sharp reduction in the emission levels in almost all transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, given their persistent economic difficulties, especially in the 1990s. Russia, which is one of the major global emitters, “managed” to reduce its emissions by almost 30% between 1990 and 2009, while Ukraine cut them by more than 60% in the same period.

The third and most recent pillar of this regime is the Paris Agreement, which has been in force since October 2016. Its main goal is to keep the average global temperature at most up to 2 degrees above the pre-industrial average. An important breakthrough is the provision that all countries, regardless of their stage of development, shall report on their efforts and intentions to mitigate the problems in a more frequent basis, the so-called “nationally determined contributions” (NDC), which thereby has softened the principle of differentiated responsibility under both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.[6]

Evidently, the economic, demographic and social differences between the countries fuel the political divergences between them and create enormous difficulties to reach a consensus. When the UNFCCC was signed, in the early 1990s, there were major controversies about the differentiated responsibilities between the developing and the developed countries towards the GHG emissions. To make matters worse, some developing nations, such as China, India and some oil-producing countries, have increased their emissions dramatically since then. China, which has been the largest emitter of CO2 since mid-2000s, currently accounts for almost twice the emissions of the US, the second largest polluter.

However, as argued by the Chinese, the Indian and even the Brazilian governments, any negotiation on new agreements or targets should always be based on per capita comparisons and on the level of development of each country, as some can afford or are more flexible to invest in cleaner technologies. When we take these parameters into account, the picture becomes quite distinct as regards the absolute emissions. In general, countries that are major oil producers, have high income per capita or are located in temperate regions tend to have higher emission rates.

In this context, the Brazilian government has been historically a supporter of the notion of sustainable development and the principle of differentiated responsibilities between governments. In addition to the general trend of alignment with major emerging nations, the national diplomacy has actively worked with the US to formulate and implement the CDM. In 2015, in its NDC of the Paris Agreement, the nation proposed to curb GHG emissions “by 37% of the 2005 levels by 2025” and “43% below the 2005 levels by 2030”.[7] However, there are still serious doubts about whether the goals established will be achieved by the deadlines set, given the recent increase in the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest (one of the main causes of GHG emissions in the country). Furthermore, some important members of Temer’s cabinet have explicitly expressed their discomfort at the way Brazil participates in the Paris Agreement.[8]

This set of agreements, which has enormous potential for effectively softening global ecological problems, has also created and reproduced important contradictions that may jeopardize the global effort to promote the adoption of cleaner economic growth models. Thus, the lack of periodic revision of the lists of the Kyoto Protocol has generated blatant cases of opportunism in relation to some former “developing” countries. Despite presenting very high per capita income levels and being among the largest polluters in relative terms, the Persian Gulf monarchies remain free from the commitments of the Annex I nations. Moreover, some high emitters have been disengaging from the climate change regime. In addition to the notorious example of the United States, which refused to approve the Kyoto Protocol and, more recently, has sought to detach from the Paris Agreement, other great powers have followed suit. Canada, claiming economic problems, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, while Russia decided not to participate in the second round of emission reductions under that treaty and has faced strong internal opposition to ratify the Paris Agreement.

Although the international climate change regime has experienced undeniable progress and has been able to count on increasingly effective monitor and control mechanisms over the last few decades, there is no guarantee that the trend will continue in the same direction. Unlike the previous decades, when disinterest in the issue was greater in developing countries, in recent times, there has been an increase in criticism in richer nations. Unfortunately, the US case cannot be seen as an exception, but rather as a rule. At the same time, countries of later industrialization, such as China and India, have been playing a leading role in the development of a cleaner energy matrix, given the serious environmental problems that their populations have been undergoing.

[1] UNITED NATIONS. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Sustainable Development Goals. Retrieved from on Jul 26, 2017.

[2] The expression “least developed countries” (LDC) is used extensively in the UN system and is updated annually by the General Assembly. In 2016, for instance, it decided that Angola would be no longer considered a LDC after 2021.

[3] It establishes a system of carbon credits based on a logic of economic incentives to promote the reduction of greenhouse gases. The issuing authorities are normally governments (national or local). In short, companies that want to increase their emissions need to buy carbon credits from the government or from other companies that own credits.

[4] It enables a part of Annex 1 countries to invest in carbon cut projects in developing countries.

[5] It allows a given country in Annex 1 to invest in carbon cut projects in another country of the list. In this case, the reduction will be accounted for by the former, while the latter will obtain foreign investments and technology transfer.

[6] THE WORLD BANK. Total greenhouse gas emissions (kiloton of CO2 equivalent). 2017. Retrieved from on Jul 27, 2017.

[7] REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL. Pretendida contribuição nacionalmente determinada para consecução do objetivo da Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre mudança do clima. [2015]. Retrieved from on Jul 31, 2017.

[8] GINARDI, G. Para Blairo Maggi, metas brasileiras para o clima são só ‘intenção’. Portal Estadão, 17 de novembro de 2016. Retrieved from on Jul 31, 2017.

Editorial

China’s economic rise has dominated the agenda of analysts and researchers for many decades. In fact, throughout this period, the country has experienced spectacular growth rates, which has boosted its foreign trade and direct investments extraordinarily. More recently, although its rates have declined, as compared to the ones of the previous cycle, China keeps moving at the fastest pace among bigger economies, apart from India, prompting further analysis of its challenges and strategies.

Since China started promoting a diplomatic and economic opening in the 1970s, it has undergone several transformations in terms of trade and investment. At first, while receiving investments from the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe to diversify its industrial park, its exports were predominantly primary — mainly oil. Over the years, however, the Chinese have become the world’s leading exporters, selling manufactured goods, whose aggregate value has not stopped growing. At the same time, their need for primary products has made them the largest importer of commodities, such as iron ore, soybeans and crude oil. This fact is shown in trade relations with Brazil and more specifically with the State of Rio Grande do Sul, whose partnership with China is based on the sale of commodities and the purchase of manufactured goods.

In this issue of Panorama Internacional, therefore, we will address some matters that pervade the dilemmas of China’s ascension and its relations with Brazil and Rio Grande do Sul. To do so, we selected articles that cover some recent political changes in China and the Chinese agriculture, technological innovation policies and foreign policy. However, we do not intend to exhaust the debate on the subjects chosen for this issue, and we also recognize the relevance of other topics that had to be left out of the discussion. Nonetheless, we do believe that this issue can contribute to the controversies over China’s rise, enlightening matters that, in general, delimit Beijing’s strategic behavior.

In Tarson Núñes’s article, we notice that, given the hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party in the country’s politics, it is necessary to look at the state to understand the dynamics of the Chinese economy. Hence, we can see an attempt by the Chinese government to adapt to the new international scenario, after the crisis of 2008, in order to harmonize the socioeconomic issues with the conjuncture. Thus, in its official resolutions, the Chinese government has already stressed its commitment to promote the transition from an export-led growth model to one with an emphasis on the domestic market to provide for the well-being of its new middle class. For this aim, the need for improvements in labor relations and environmental issues — abandoning the strategy to push for growth at any cost — is asserted, as well as the ambition to technologically qualify the country and increase the productivity of the economy.

Next, in Sérgio Leusin Jr.’s analysis, we find out that agriculture is another area in which China has been undergoing major transformations. Indeed, although the country has become a major importer of food, its agricultural sector is still large, especially when it comes to rice, tobacco, wheat, corn and soybeans. However, since rural flight remains a persistent social phenomenon, the government has been seeking ways to raise agricultural productivity in an ecologically sustainable way, to curb the flow of population towards urban centers. In addition, Leusin Jr. points out that government subsidies are a crucial element of the Chinese agriculture, once the government purchases a portion of the production and sets minimum prices, causing distortions in the global food trade, which has already been reported to the WTO by the United States.

After that, in Iván Tartaruga’s text, the incentives for technological development in China are scrutinized, a topic which has drawn the attention of scholars in recent years. In fact, especially since 2008, investment in research and development has skyrocketed, leaving China only behind the U.S. in this regard. Tartaruga argues that, despite all this, the amount invested does not in itself guarantee a greater generation of innovation, and precisely for that reason, the Chinese have been seeking to connect these policies with their country’s socioeconomic needs in three ways: (a) by fostering inclusive innovation, targeting low income population; (b) by organizing innovation pools in some provinces; (c) by prioritizing “clean” or “green” technologies. Yet, Tartaruga cautions that the lack of a competitive business environment conducive to innovation can hamper the Chinese advance in this area.

Finally, Robson Valdez’s study addresses the political and economic relations between China and Brazil and between China and the State of Rio Grande do Sul. In his view, our country and our state are at a crossroads, once our relationship with China is apparently no longer based on mutual benefits that would contribute to our development. Besides the aforementioned trade asymmetry, as a result of the fact that primary products constitute the core of our exports to China, another issue is that the Chinese are eager to acquire some key sectors of our economy. Instead of promoting Brazil’s advancement, Chinese investments appear to be serving Beijing’s interests exclusively, in a context in which both Brazil’s and Rio Grande do Sul’s governments have set fiscal stability as top priority. Thus, in order to overcome short-term obstacles, they are giving up mechanisms and instruments that could be used to promote economic growth and implement long-term public policies, thereby compromising national sovereignty.

This issue’s interviewee is Carlos Aguiar de Medeiros, PhD in Economics from the State University of Campinas (Unicamp) and Associate Professor at the Economics Institute of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Medeiros’s research focuses on development, unemployment, technology, growth, industrialization, the state, markets, monetary standards, balance of payments and international projection.

Enjoy your reading!

Go East! Updating strategy and tactics in the U.S. foreign policy for Asia

In an article published in Foreign Policy magazine in the late 2011, it was asserted that the United States was shifting emphasis in its foreign policy. The text was signed by none other than the then U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. In the subtitle, she stressed that “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq”[1], and because of that, she urged the United States to be a protagonist in the process of emergence of East Asia as an economic and, increasingly, geopolitical center. Therefore, she argued that the United States, rather than simply bring home its troops allocated in the two countries abovementioned, should relocate them across the Asia-Pacific, so that the country retained its status as leader and guarantor of the liberal global order.

It is noticeable that in her article, as well as in other speeches in the White House and in the Department of State, the author seeks to avoid an explicit rhetoric of confrontation with China, which seems to be the main novelty of the new U.S. strategy for Asia. The presence of the United States in that region and its military and economic hegemony, as we will see, are not exactly a recent originality, as they have been constant over the past decades.

The pivot to Asia-Pacific is a strategy to face China, which, in turn, explains the new tactics adopted even before the publication of Clinton’s article. The strategic change, which in some ways can be traced back to the 1990s, stems from the reassertion of the U.S. regional supremacy in the context of the rapid Chinese rise. To accomplish this task, it is expected that military forces will concentrate on the region again and that projects on trade regulation, diplomatic initiatives and the strengthening of military alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Southeast Asian countries will be launched. However, the general direction of the American foreign policy has remained the same over the past decades, which is to keep the nation as the leading force that promotes trade framework, economic flows, navigation and the environment in that region.

The current U.S. presence in Asia is not new. Already in the mid-19th century, the country was prominent in the Pacific in the cases of deployment of war fleets to impose treaties to China and Japan. By the end of the century, the United States emerged as a major force in the Pacific Ocean, with the territorial conquests of Hawaii and the Philippines. After World War II, the U.S. supremacy culminated with the defeat of Japan and the relative weakening of Great Britain and France. Since then, the United States has retained primacy in Asia-Pacific by maintaining a large portion of its naval fleet in that part of the world, keeping a dense network of regional allies and military bases along a zone ranging from Alaska to Malaysia, including the Aleutian Islands, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, thus de facto controlling the Strait of Malacca, a key point for global shipping routes. This massive presence in Asia-Pacific, comparable only to the relevance of Western Europe, was persistent in the U.S. foreign action during the Cold War, not only to halt a possible military advance of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, but also to enable a nuclear deterrence against both nations.

In addition to the military presence, the U.S. foreign policy has explicitly stimulated economic empowerment of many countries in the region, and the Colombo Plan[2] is illustrative of that. This policy can be understood either for strategic reasons, to face common threats, or for economic ambitions, given the increasing transnationalization of U.S. conglomerates. Japan succeeded in its economic reconstruction already in the late 1950s, thanks to the pre-existence of important national economic groups, among other factors. It was then followed by “waves” of economic miracles, such as the Asian Tigers in the 1970s and 1980s (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) and the New Tigers in the following decades (the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and, more recently, Vietnam).

In the case of China, still in 1971, the country not only normalized relations with the United States, but also reoriented its global policy, thus becoming an important player in the opposition to the Soviet Union. This allowed the influx of investments from the United States and mainly from Japan, even before the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping, by the end of that decade. Since then, China’s economic progress has been remarkable, providing the country with economic strength both regionally and globally. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of an economically strong and politically more confident China has increasingly been a reason for worry in the U.S., although some economic sectors in the latter kept interest in the continuity of the progress of China. The result was an ambiguous American foreign policy toward China at that time: on the one hand, the U.S. hampered the Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization and banned the arms trade as a response to the tragic events of 1989[3], on the other hand, it did not stop or reduce the volume of economic flows between both nations.

During the election campaign in 2008, Barack H. Obama and his supporters emphasized the need for the United States to turn to Asia, and criticized the presence of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since he took over the presidency in 2009, the diplomatic relations with China have degraded in light of disagreements about trade, monetary and environmental policies. Moreover, the dispute over the control of the maritime territories between the countries of the region, including China and some of the local U.S. allies, has aggravated in the period.

In this context, the Asia-Pacific pivot embraces different tactics on at least three fronts. The first one is military, through the expansion of the contingent stationed in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in Australia and Thailand. A similar process may occur in the Navy, with the increase from 50% to 60% of the overall U.S. naval capability in the region.[4] From a qualitative point of view, a doctrine of Air-Sea Battle has been released, the design of which, according to U.S. military experts, is a response to the development of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrines by certain countries, including China.

The second kind of tactics is basically economic, and the flagship has been the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP, which was signed in the early 2016 and is awaiting ratification, covers issues that go beyond trade liberalization, such as labor regulation, intellectual property rights, among other matters, and involves 11 countries of the Pacific basin, with the notable exceptions of China and Russia.[5] The third method of promoting influence has been by means of diplomacy itself, through the expansion and strengthening of regional alliances, especially with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with which the United States has signed a treaty of friendship. Furthermore, the continuity and, in some cases, the deepening of the bilateral relations with India[6], South Korea and Japan is a process that was already visible during the Bush administration.

The Asian pivot is an ongoing process, which can be summed up as a strategic readjustment of the United States, given the perception that China questions the current correlation of forces, which is more favorable to Washington than to Beijing. Although China has gained ground on the economic realm and has been increasing its military expenditures, thus narrowing the gap between itself and the U.S., the latter remains superior in several areas, such as the military competition (especially maritime), the influence of regional actors, the level of technological development and the ability to enforce international rules and regimes. This strategy has been possible thanks to the gradual disengagement of the U.S. from the Middle East, although serious problems in Europe, particularly in Ukraine, may distract Washington. Moreover, this new configuration may relegate other parts of the world, especially South America and Sub-Saharan Africa, to a secondary role within the strategic priorities of the U.S.

[1] CLINTON, Hillary. America’s Pacific Century. Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2011. Retrieved from on Aug. 31, 2016.

[2] Sometimes dubbed as the “Asian Marshall Plan”, in a reference to the European reconstruction plan, the Colombo Plan is actually an international organization whose purpose was not economic reconstruction, but rather the development of countries in South, Southeast and East Asia.

[3] In that year, protests took the streets in several cities in China, to which authorities responded with violence in some cases, eventually causing a massacre in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.

[4] SUTTER, Robert G. et al. Balancing acts:  the U.S. rebalance and Asia-Pacific stability. Retrieved from < http://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assts/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf> on Sep. 13, 2016.

[5] For a deeper insight on the TPP and other mega-regional trade agreements, see: Valdez, R. Brazil and the mega trade agreements: principles, history and challenges. Retrieved from < http://panoramainternacional.fee.tche.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20160610panorama_v1_n4_en_final.pdf> on Sep. 14, 2016.

[6] In 2010, India received explicit U.S. support to occupy a permanent seat in an eventual reform of the United Nations Security Council.

The United States: “a nation in permanent war”

In an interview for Panorama, Cristina evaluates the current context in the United States, which, in her opinion, is going through a political secession and a social war. The researcher argues that the 2016 elections in the United States were polarized, inciting violence and prejudice. She also shares her views about the changes in the foreign policy of Barack Obama in comparison with that of George W. Bush and discusses the geopolitical role of Brazil in the American geopolitical strategy.

Panorama: Soon after his inauguration in 2009, Barack Obama sought to make clear his different intentions in foreign policy in comparison with those of the Bush Era (2001-08). He mentioned, for example, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, the end of the Guantanamo detention camp and the “reset” of the relations with Russia. In your assessment, what really changed in terms of foreign policy between Bush and Obama?

The main change in Obama’s foreign policy compared to that of the administration of Bush Jr. refers to the tactical and rhetorical style. While Bush used to act unilaterally and hold a militarist tone in his agenda even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Obama engaged in translating the hegemonic acts into multilateral and cooperative agendas. Thus, there was a certain acceptance of his positions in the international community, although, in practice, a closer examination shows a high level of continuity between the Democratic and the Republican administrations. Among the elements of continuity, we can highlight the persistence of the American military supremacy, the maintenance of the power projection in the Middle East, despite the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, the tension between Russia and the U.S., in particular on issues such as Syria, the spy programs, among others. But Obama happened to be more successful than Bush because of impact actions such as the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which has hidden tensions and fragmentations such as the rise of the Islamic State.

Panorama: Several analysts have pointed out the fragile recovery of the U.S. economy after the 2007-09 crisis as well as the increase in inequality that has characterized the last decades in the U.S. In recent news, we can notice an aggravation of episodes of racial violence. How do these social and economic problems interfere with American politics?

The United States is a nation in permanent war, both within and outside its borders. Externally, the demands of expansion and military projection generate constant deficits in the government accounts which are not expected to be revised. Internally, the economic recovery is unable to generate jobs systematically, bringing the unemployment rate to over 10% in many U.S. states, especially those affected by foreign competition. Likewise, it is a country marked by falling income, wage stagnation and racial tensions. The fiscal and trade deficits further weaken the economy. This scenario is illustrated by the outbursts of daily violence all over the country which are not limited to racial violence, but also involve gender, sexual preferences, ideological choices, leading to a polarized politics. The symbol of this process is Trump’s candidature, as it reflects all the rage and dissatisfaction emanating from society over the economic crisis, the fear and the fragmentation generated by the ascension of black and Hispanic minorities as a majority in the population and the proportional loss of space of the so-called American “WASP”, white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant population. It is a nation in political secession and social war.

 

Panorama: The 2016 elections in the United States were remarkable due to an intense polarization not only between Republicans and Democrats, but also along the primaries. Is there a parallel between this context and the political polarization also under way in Brazil?

The polarization of the 2016 elections in the United States, coupled with the incitement of violence and prejudice, especially by the Republican candidate, which emptied the space for the discussion of political projects, is a reflection of the social transformations undergone in the country. Such transformations, which are related to income changes, ethnicity, ideology, population profile, are common to many countries, including Brazil and many nations of the European Union (and the world in general). As a constructive debate is absent, personal and offensive attacks are preferred, through which the problem is attributed to the “other”, the immigrant, the gender, the race or the religion. What is observed is a tendency towards xenophobia, lack of tolerance and dialogue in a comprehensive way. The point is that very few people have mobilized to try to resume a constructive debate not based on prejudice. Times are tough, but we must try to restore a certain balance. Historical periods without this balance have been followed by major humanitarian disasters, such as World War II and the Nazi experience.

Panorama: If we follow the speeches of the new government in Brazil, the agenda focused on regional integration and multilateralism will be replaced by a global integration with more attention to Washington and other advanced economies. What should the role of Brazil be in the U.S. geopolitical strategy and how can this strategy interfere with our economic decisions?

A Brazil aligned with the U.S. without a focus on regional integration in South America, distant from its partners in the coalitions of emerging countries, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa), is a weak country and, therefore, subordinate to the Americans. All the attempts in which Brazil sought this position were times of few internal and external achievements, since there were loses in its bargaining power, and its economic decisions became limited to the U.S. policy. The geopolitical role of Brazil vis-à-vis the U.S. is irrelevant. Paradoxically, the United States fears, but recognizes a strong Brazil. However, the U.S. prefers a weak Brazil, although that may bring larger social, political, strategic costs to South America. The focus on the North-South axis and on the mitigation of the South-South partnerships is detrimental to Brazil, but it is also cyclical in the international relations of the country due to the strength of the U.S.

[1] Free translation of Grupo de Estudo Inserção Internacional Brasileira: Projeção Global e Regional.