The dynamics of the integration process depends, by definition, on the agreement of the hegemonic political forces in each country regarding its national objectives. In the case of Mercosur, the election that took place on the 25th of October in Argentina has a meaningful weight on the perspectives on regional integration. When this article is published, the results of the election will have already been defined. It is, therefore, less the case of evaluating the electoral process, but of analyzing its impact on the future of Mercosur. It is evident that the Argentinian election is only one among many other factors that affect the bloc’s evolution. Both the domestic political processes in the other countries and the international dynamics itself are decisive factors. However, the results in Argentina, the second most important country in the bloc, will surely have a meaningful weight.
Two main projects ran for this election: the continuity of Kirchner’s peronism, represented by the candidacy of the Governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Daniel Scioli, of the Front for Victory (FPV), and the opposition, of liberal hue, represented by Mauricio Macri, mayor of Buenos Aires, of the Republican Proposal (PRO). Scioli ran with a nationalist, center-left platform for the continuity of the current Government’s project, characterized by many analysts as populist. Macri, on the other hand, already agglutinated a set of political forces of liberal, center-right, pro-market hue. The opposition candidate represented a bet on a radical change in Argentinian politics, focused on the search for a restoration of the country’s relations with foreign investors and the review of the developmentalist strategy implemented in recent years.
Scioli, by contrast, was clearly the continuity candidate, although his relationship with officialism has always been somewhat conflicting. The Governor of the province of Buenos Aires was vice president in the first term of Néstor Kirchner’s administration (2003-06) and had aspirations regarding the presidency. He lost ground to Cristina and has since adopted a position of relative detachment to the extent that he even established a cordial relationship with the president’s archenemies, such as the media group Clarin. Although he has remained in the FPV, he sought to make clear his views differed from Cristina’s. However, the convergence between the recovery of the Government’s popularity and the fact that Scioli was the most electorally viable candidate made the two extremes of this complex relationship approach once again, a move that was consolidated by the nomination of kircherist Carlos Zanini for Scioli’s vice president.
As regards integration, the views of the two major candidates showed a clear distinction. The candidate of the ruling party incorporated explicitly an integrationist approach into his speech, focusing on Latin America and the South-South relations. In this context, Brazil is a strategic ally, and Argentina’s priority should be to “[…] strengthen and expand Mercosur, consolidate Unasur and give greater dynamism to Celac”.[1] Macri, on his turn, argued that Argentina needed to “reinsert itself in the world” and leave the “Bolivarian axis”.[2] To Rogelio Frigerio, one of his main contributors, “[…] it is necessary to review Mercosur and begin to look more to the Pacific”.[3] The candidate explicitly expressed his skepticism about the bloc, stating that it is now “[…] almost fiction, full of deadlocks, victim of a setback compared with what had been achieved in the past decade”.[4] A superficial reading of the candidates’ positioning, therefore, points to a simplistic view: if Macri wins, the country will break up with Mercosur; if Scioli wins, there will be a greater integration.
However, the reality is often more complex, especially with respect to the relationship between Argentina and its neighbors. On the one hand, it is inevitable to see that Cristina Kirchner’s integrationist speech in her two terms in office has not always been followed by concrete actions. On the contrary, the frequent imposition of barriers in relation to Brazilian exports and the Argentinian objections that have blocked the Mercosur-European Union agreement show that, in real life, such attitudes on the part of Argentina have hindered more than aided the integration furthering. The internal contradictions of the Argentinian politics and economy have imposed a dynamics in which the national interests tend to pose obstacles to the deepening of the integration.
Argentina has been through two big waves of deindustrialization: the first one, during the military dictatorship years (1976-85), and the second one, in the 1990s, in Carlos Menem’s terms in office. Until 1976, manufacturing accounted for more than two-thirds of the total Argentinian exports. The share of manufacturing in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country fell from 30.9% in 1989 to 17.1% in 1998. Therefore, the protection of the national industry tends to be a priority of the government, which implies the adoption of protectionist measures. In addition, the country has been experiencing serious currency exchange problems since the default of the early 2000s and the subsequent conflicts with creditors, which also imposes structural limits to its trade balance. These two factors mean that the government tends to adopt measures that are contradictory to its prointegration speech.
On the other hand, Macri`s proposal to break with a project focused on the region and on the search for a greater openness towards the rest of the world does not imply renouncing integration. To Argentina, Mercosur keeps being essential. The bloc has generated a trade growth 12 times higher among its members since its formation. In 2013, Argentina destined 28% of its exports to its regional partners and received 28% of its imports from them. This trade registered a high coefficient of intra-industry trade: over 50% of the total exports of manufactured goods from Argentina were allocated to the bloc.
Moreover, the high degree of institutionalization in the process implies a cost for its rupture. The leader of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), party that supports Macri, has said that “[…] it is very difficult for any government to revert the integration processes”, “[…] the correlation of parliamentary forces will not change much and many decisions depend on this state of affairs”.[5] This hinders radical changes under the agreement terms. Moreover, the institutional structure of Mercosur, gestated in the 1990s, is not incompatible with Macri’s liberal agenda.
Therefore, for the liberals, despite the pursuit of greater openness to the rest of the world, Mercosur, in its current design (as a free trade agreement, which is highly advantageous for the Argentinian economy), is also functional. The cost of a rupture would not justify the necessary political effort. Still, the trend, in case PRO wins, is for the country to progressively detach from the bloc’s agenda, with few real efforts to promote the advancement of integration. In this sense, in the long term, Macri’s victory could indeed lead to some kind of weakening of Mercosur’s dynamics. The attempt to leave the “Bolivarian axis” and to extend its relations with other blocs and countries was an important part of the opposition speech.
On the other hand, in case Scioli wins, the starting point tends to be the same: the bloc will continue as it is today — at a slow pace amid deadlocks often caused by Argentina itself. This can result in the continuation of the current dynamics. However, if the starting point is the same, this outcome can also make room for new developments. If the candidate of the ruling party wins, it is possible that the integrationist vocation statements of peronism, far more rhetorical than real, can go beyond the speech. The ideas of productive complementation, value chain articulation on a regional scale and the integration initiatives in the area of infrastructure represent a potentially innovative approach.
The continuity of a FPV government may then make room for a new dynamics, a strategy for deepening Mercosur. In his platform, Scioli champions the resolution of intra-bloc trade disputes, a greater political boost of the productive integration, the repositioning of the strategy of international insertion of the bloc, the addition of value and technological content to strategic sectors and investments in infrastructure and energy integration projects.[6] In this case, the election results can lead to important advances in the region’s integration process.
[1] The Union of South American Nations (Unasur) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) are two integrationist projects that emerged from an articulation of the countries which aspired to have a protagonist role in the hemisphere, out of the United States’ orbit. Translation mine.
GENTILI, P. Scioli y Macri ante el Mercosur. Página 12, Buenos Aires, 14 jul. 2015. Retrieved from
[2] GENTILI, P. Scioli y Macri ante el Mercosur. Página 12, Buenos Aires, 14 jul. 2015. Retrieved from
[3] PARTIDO de Macri apuesta a revisar el Mercosur. Montevideo Portal, Montevideo, 10 nov. 2014. Retrieved from
[4] MACRI: “Hay que recuperar el Mercosur”. Buenos Aires Ciudad, Buenos Aires, 27 mayo 2013. Retrieved from
[5] MOREAU: Macri no fortalecería la relación com el Mercosur. BAE Negocios, Buenos Aires, 18 dez. 2014. Retrieved from < http://www.diariobae.com/notas/48421-moreau-macri-fortaleceria-la-relacion-con-el-mercosur.html>.
[6] DESARROLLO ARGENTINO (DAR). El-Mercosur y los desafios de la regionalización. 2015. Retrieved from
